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ABSTRACT
We examine the properties of all HTTP requests generated
by a thousand undergraduates over a span of two months.
Preserving user identity in the data set allows us to discover
novel properties of Web traffic that directly affect models
of hypertext navigation. We find that the popularity of
Web sites—the number of users who contribute to their
traffic—lacks any intrinsic mean and may be unbounded.
Further, many aspects of the browsing behavior of individ-
ual users can be approximated by log-normal distributions
even though their aggregate behavior is scale-free. Finally,
we show that users’ click streams cannot be cleanly seg-
mented into sessions using timeouts, affecting any attempt
to model hypertext navigation using statistics of individual
sessions. We propose a strictly logical definition of sessions
based on browsing activity as revealed by referrer URLs; a
user may have several active sessions in their click stream at
any one time. We demonstrate that applying a timeout to
these logical sessions affects their statistics to a lesser extent
than a purely timeout-based mechanism.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.2 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Network
Protocols—HTTP ; H.3.4 [Information Storage and Re-
trieval]: Systems and Software—Information networks; H.5.4
[Information Interfaces and Presentation]: Hypertext/
Hypermedia—Navigation, user issues
General Terms
Measurement
Keywords
Web traffic, Web session, popularity, navigation, click stream
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1. INTRODUCTION
We report our analysis of the Web traffic of approximately
one thousand residential users over a two-month period.
This data set preserves the distinctions between individual
users, making possible detailed per-user analysis. We believe
this is the largest study to date to examine the complete click
streams of so many users in their place of residence for an
extended period of time, allowing us to observe how actual
users navigate a hyperlinked information space while not un-
der direct observation. The first contributions of this work
include the discoveries that the popularity of Web sites as
measured by distinct visitors is unbounded; that many of the
power-law distributions previously observed in Web traffic
are aggregates of log-normal distributions at the user level;
and that there exist two populations of users who are dis-
tinguished by whether or not their Web activity is largely
mediated by portal sites.
A second set of contributions concerns our analysis of
browsing sessions within the click streams of individual users.
The concept of a Web session is critical to modeling real-
world navigation of hypertext, understanding the impact of
search engines, developing techniques to identify automated
navigation and retrieval, and creating means of anonymizing
(and de-anonymizing) user activity on the Web. We show
that a simple timeout-based approach is inadequate for iden-
tifying sessions and present an algorithm for segmenting a
click stream into logical sessions based on referrer informa-
tion. We use the properties of these logical sessions to show
that actual users navigate hypertext in ways that violate a
stateless random surfer model and require the addition of
backtracking or branching.
Finally, we emphasize which aspects of this data present
possible opportunities for anomaly detection in Web traf-
fic. Robust anomaly detection using these properties makes
it possible to uncover “bots” masquerading as legitimate
user agents. It may also undermine the effectiveness of
anonymization tools, making it necessary to obscure addi-
tional properties of a user’s Web surfing to avoid betraying
their identity.
Contributions and Outline
In the remainder of this paper, after some background and
related work, we describe the source and collection proce-
dures of our Web traffic data. The raw data set includes
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over 400 million HTTP requests generated by over a thou-
sand residential users over the course of two months, and we
believe it to provide the most accurate picture to date of the
hypertext browsing behavior of individual users as observed
directly from the network.
Our main contributions are organized into three sections:
• We confirm earlier findings of scale-free distributions
for various per-site traffic properties aggregated across
users. We show this also holds for site popularity as
measured by the number of unique vistors. (§ 4)
• We offer the first characterization of individual traffic
patterns involving continuous collection from a large
population. We find that properties such as jump fre-
quency, browsing rates, and the use of portals are not
scale-free, but rather log-normally distributed. Only
when aggregated across users do these properties ex-
hibit scale-free behavior. (§ 5)
• We investigate the notion of a Web “session,” show-
ing that neither a simple timeout nor a rolling average
provide a robust definition. We propose an alternative
notion of logical session and provide an algorithm for
its construction. While logical sessions have no inher-
ent temporal scale, they are amenable to the addition
of a timeout with little net effect on their statistical
properties. (§ 6)
We conclude with a discussion of the limitations of our
data, the implications of this work for modeling and anomaly
detection, and potential future work in the area.
2. BACKGROUND
Internet researchers have been quick to recognize that
structural analysis of the Web becomes far more useful when
combined with actual behavioral data. The link structure of
the Web can differ greatly from the set of paths that are ac-
tually navigated, and it tells us little about the behavior of
individual users. A variety of behavioral data sources exist
that can allow researchers to identify these paths and im-
prove Web models accordingly. The earliest efforts have used
browser logs to characterize user navigation patterns [4],
time spent on pages, bookmark usage, page revisit frequen-
cies, and overlap among user paths [6]. The most direct
source of behavioral data comes from the logs of Web servers,
which have been used for applications such as personaliza-
tion [16] and improving caching behavior [21]. More recent
efforts involving server logs have met with notable success
in describing typical user behavior [10]. Because search en-
gines serve a central role in users’ navigation, their log data
is particularly useful in improving search results based on
user behavior [1, 12].
Other researchers have turned to the Internet itself as a
source of data on Web behavior. Network flow data gen-
erated by routers, which incorporates high-level details of
Internet connections without revealing the contents of indi-
vidual packets, has been used to identify statistical prop-
erties of Web user behavior and discriminate peer-to-peer
traffic from genuine Web activity [14, 15, 7].
The most detailed source of behavioral data consists of
actual Web traffic captured from a running network, as we
do here. The present study most closely relates to the work
of Qiu et al. [19], who used captured HTTP packet traces to
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Figure 1: System architecture for data collection.
investigate a variety of statistical properties of users’ brows-
ing behavior, especially the extent on which they appear to
rely on search engines in their navigation of the Web.
We have also used captured HTTP requests in our pre-
vious work to describe ways in which PageRank’s random-
surfer model fails to approximate actual user behavior, which
calls into question its use for ranking search results [13]. One
way of overcoming these shortcomings is to substitute actual
traffic data for ranking pages [11]. However, this may cre-
ate a feedback cycle in which traffic grows super-linearly
with popularity, leading to a situation (sometimes called
“Googlearchy”) in which a few popular sites dominate the
Web and lesser known sites are difficult to discover [18, 8].
More importantly for the present work, simply accepting
traffic data as a given does not further our understanding of
user behavior. We can also overcome the deficiencies of the
random-surfer model by improving the model itself. This
paper offers analysis of key features of observed behavior to
support the development of improved agent-based models of
Web traffic [9].
The present study also relates to work in anomaly detec-
tion and anonymization software for the Web. The Web
Tap project, for example, attempted to discover anomalous
traffic requests using metrics such as request regularity and
interrequest delay time, quantities which we discuss in the
present work [2]. The success of systems that aim to pre-
serve the anonymity of Web users is known to be dependent
on a variety of empirical properties of behavioral data, some
of which we directly address here [20].
3. DATA DESCRIPTION
3.1 Data Source
The click data we use in this study was gathered from
a dedicated FreeBSD server located in the central routing
facility of the Bloomington campus of Indiana University
(Figure 1). This system had a 1 Gbps Ethernet port that
received a mirror of all outbound network traffic from one
of the undergraduate dormitories. This dormitory consists
of four wings of five floors each and is home to just over
a thousand undergraduates. Its population is split roughly
evenly between men and women, and its location causes it to
have a somewhat greater proportion of music and education
students than other campus housing.
To obtain information on individual HTTP requests pass-
ing over this interface, we first use a Berkeley Packet Filter
to capture only packets destined for TCP port 80. While
this eliminates from consideration all Web traffic running
on non-standard ports, it does give us access to the great
majority of it. We make no attempt to capture or analyze
encrypted (HTTPS) traffic using TCP port 443. Once we
have obtained a packet destined for port 80, we use a reg-
ular expression search against the payload of the packet to
determine whether it contains an HTTP GET request.
If we do find an HTTP GET request in the packet, we
analyze the packet further to determine the virtual host con-
tacted, the path requested, the referring URL, and the ad-
vertised identity of the user agent. We then write a record
to our raw data files that contains the MAC address of the
client system, a timestamp, the virtual host, the path re-
quested, the referring URL, and a flag indicating whether
the user agent matches a mainstream browser (Internet Ex-
plorer, Mozilla/Firefox, Safari, or Opera). We maintain
record of the MAC address only in order to distinguish the
traffic of individual users. We thus assume that most com-
puters in the building have a single primary user, which is
reasonable in light of the connectedness of the student popu-
lation (only a small number of public workstations are avail-
able in the dormitory). Furthermore, as long as the users
do not replace the network interface in their computer, this
information remains constant.
The aggregate traffic of the dormitory was sufficiently low
so that our sniffing system could maintain a full rate of
collection without dropping packets. While our collection
system offers a rare opportunity to capture the complete
browsing activity of a large user population, we do recognize
some potential disadvantages of our data source. Because we
do not perform TCP stream reassembly, we can only ana-
lyze HTTP requests that fit in a single 1,500 byte Ethernet
frame. While the vast majority of requests do so, some GET-
based Web services generate extremely long URLs. Without
stream reassembly, we cannot log the Web server’s response
to each request: some requests will result in redirections or
server errors, and we are unable to determine which ones.
Finally, a user can spoof the HTTP referrer field; we assume
that few students do so, and those who do generate a small
portion of the overall traffic.
3.2 Data Dimensions
The click data was collected over a period of about two
months, from March 5, 2008 through May 3, 2008. This pe-
riod included a week-long vacation during which no students
were present in the building. During the full data collection
period, we logged nearly 408 million HTTP requests from a
total of 1,083 unique MAC addresses.
Not every HTTP request from a client is indicative of an
actual human being trying to fetch a Web page; in fact,
such requests actually constitute a minority of all HTTP
requests. For this reason, we retain only those URLs that
are likely to be requests for actual Web pages, as opposed
to media files, style sheets, Javascript code, images, and so
forth. This determination is based on the extension of the
URL requested, which is imprecise but functions well as a
heuristic in the absence of access to the HTTP Content-
type header in the server responses. We also filtered out a
small subset of users with negligible activity; their traffic
consisted largely of automated Windows Update requests
and did not provide meaningful data about user activity.
Finally, we also discovered the presence of a poorly-written
anonymization service that was attempting to obscure traffic
to a particular adult chat site by spoofing requests from
hundreds of uninvolved clients. These requests were also
removed from the data set.
We found that some Web clients issue duplicate HTTP re-
Table 1: Approximate dimensions of the filtered and
anonymized data set.
Page requests 29.8 million
Unique users 967
Web servers 630,000
Referring hosts 110,000
quests (same referring URL and same target URL) in nearly
simultaneous bursts. These bursts occur independently of
the type of URL being requested and are less than a single
second wide. We conjecture that they may involve check-
ing for updated content, but we are unable to confirm this
without access to the original HTTP headers. Because this
behavior is so rapid that it cannot reflect deliberate activity
of individual users, we also removed the duplicate requests
from the data set.
Privacy concerns and our agreement with the Human Sub-
jects Committee of our institution also obliged us to try to
remove all identifying information from the referring and
target URLs. One means of doing so is to strip off all iden-
tifiable query parameters from the URLs. Applying this
anonymization procedure affects roughly one-third of the re-
maining requests.
The resulting data set (summarized in Table 1) is the basis
for all of the description and analysis that follows.
4. HOST-BASED PROPERTIES
Our first priority in analyzing this data set was to verify
that its statistics were consistent with those of previous stud-
ies. A previous study performed by several of the authors
used a similar data collection method to perform completely
anonymized click records from the entire Indiana University
community of roughly 100,000 users [13]. In that study, we
found that the distribution of the number of requests di-
rected to each Web server (“in-strength”, or sin) could be
well fitted by a power law Pr(sin) ∼ s−γin with exponent
γ ≈ 1.8. The distribution of sin in the present data set is
consistent with this, as shown in Figure 2A; the distribution
is linear on a log-log scale for nearly six orders of magnitude
with a slope of roughly 1.75. Similarly, in the previous study,
we found that the number of requests citing each Web server
as a referrer (“out-strength”, or sout) could be approximated
by a power law with γ ≈ 1.7. In the current study, we find
that γ ≈ 1.75 for sout, as shown in Figure 2B. The overall
distribution of traffic is thus found to be in concordance with
previous results.
The previous study was conducted under conditions of
complete anonymity for users, retaining not even informa-
tion as to whether two requests came from the same or dif-
ferent clients. Because the present data set does attribute
each request to a particular user, we were now able to ex-
amine the relative popularity of Web server as measured by
the number of distinct users contributing to their traffic. As
shown in Figures 3A and 3B, we find that the distribution
of the number of users u contributing to the inbound traf-
fic of a Web server is well approximated by a power law
Pr(u) ∼ u−β with β ≈ 2.0 and the outbound by a power
law with β ≈ 1.9.
These exponents require further comment. Because β < 3,
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Figure 2: Distributions of in-strength (A) and out-
strength (B) for each Web server in the data set. In
these and the following plots in this paper, power-
law distributions are fitted by least-squares regres-
sion on log values with log-bin-averaging and ver-
ified using the cumulative distributions and maxi-
mum likelihood methods [5].
the variance diverges as the distribution grows and is bounded
only by the finite size of the data collection. Furthermore, if
β ≤ 2, as seems to be the case for both incoming and outgo-
ing popularity, the distributions lack any intrinsic mean as
well. This implies the lack of any inherent ceiling of popu-
larity for Web sites, regardless of the size of the user popula-
tion. Indeed, the data show that the social networking site
Facebook is a popular destination for almost 100% of the
students in our study, handily eclipsing any major search
engine or news site.
5. USER-BASED PROPERTIES
The behavior of individual users is of critical interest for
not only models of traffic, but also applications such as net-
work anomaly detection and the design of anonymization
tools. Because nearly all per-server distributions in Web
traffic exhibit scale-free properties and have extremely heavy
tails, one might anticipate that the same would be true of
Web users. If the statistics that describe user behavior lack
well-defined central tendencies, than very little individual
behavior can be described as anomalous. However, since any
given user has only finite time to devote to Web surfing, we
know that user-based distributions must be bounded. The
question is whether we can characterize “normal” individual
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Figure 3: Distributions of the number of unique
users incoming to (A) and outgoing from (B) for
each Web server in the data set. These distributions
serve as a rough measure of the popularity of a Web
site and imply that the potential audience of the
most popular sites is essentially unbounded.
traffic. If we can establish a clear picture of the typical user,
unusual users are easy to identify and have a more difficult
time maintaining their anonymity.
We first consider the distribution of sizes of the users’
individual click streams, both in terms of the total num-
ber of requests generated by each user and the number of
empty-referrer requests generated. The second distribution
is of interest because it describes the number of times a user
has jumped directly to a specific page (e.g., using a book-
mark, start page, hyperlink in an e-mail, etc.) instead of
navigating there from already viewed pages. The resulting
distributions are shown in Figures 4A and 4B. Although the
smaller size of this distributions makes fitting more difficult,
we do observe reasonably strong log-normal fits for these dis-
tributions, finding that the average user generated around
16,600 requests from 2,500 start pages over the course of two
months. We removed from both distributions a small num-
ber of users (roughly 50 in each case) whose click streams
were very small: under 2,500 requests or under 500 start
pages. Most of these were users who did not begin gener-
ating any traffic until late in the study, possibly because of
new hardware or the approach of final exams.
We next examine the distribution of the ratio of the num-
ber of empty-referrer requests to the total number of re-
quests for each user. This is a rough measure of the “jump
percentage” (sometimes referred to as the teleportation pa-
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Figure 4: Distributions of the number of requests
made per user (A) and the number of empty-referrer
requests made per user (B). We show a reference
log-normal fits to each distribution, which omit some
low-traffic users as described in the text.
rameter) in the surfing behavior of users, which is a value
of critical importance to the PageRank algorithm [17]. A
strong central tendency would imply that a random surfer
has a fairly constant jump probability overall even if the
chance of jumping varies strongly from page to page. As
shown in Figure 5, we do observe a strong fit to a log-normal
distribution with a mean of about 15%, which matches re-
markably well the jump probability most often used in Page-
Rank calculations.
Besides the number of requests generated by each user,
it is interesting to inspect the rate at which those requests
are generated. Because not every user was active for the full
duration of data collection, this cannot be deduced directly
from the distribution of total requests. In Figure 6 we show
the distribution of the number of requests per second for
each user generating an average of at least fifty requests over
the time they were active. We again obtain a reasonable fit
to a log-normal distribution with a mean of about 0.0037
requests per second or 320 requests per day.
Finally, we consider the ratio of the number of unique re-
ferring sites to the number of unique target sites for each
user. This ratio serves as a rough measure of the extent to
which a user’s behavior is typified by searching or surfing. If
the number of referring hosts is low as compared to the num-
ber of servers contacted, this implies that the user browses
the Web through a fairly small number of gateway sites,
such as search engines, social networking sites, or a personal
 0
 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
10-1.8 10-1.4 10-1.0 10-0.6 10-0.2
P
(%
 o
f 
E
m
p
ty
 R
e
fe
rr
e
r 
R
e
q
u
e
s
ts
)
% of Empty Referrer Requests
Figure 5: Distribution of the proportion of empty-
referrer requests made by each user, which roughly
corresponds to the chance that a user will jump to a
new location instead of continuing to surf. We show
a reference log-normal fit to the distribution.
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Figure 6: Distribution of the number of requests per
second made by each user, together with a reference
log-normal fit to the distribution.
bookmark file. If the number of referring hosts is high com-
pared to the number of servers contacted, this implies that
a user is more given to surfing behavior: they discover new
sites through navigation. We observe in Figure 7 that the
distribution is bimodal, implying the existence of two groups
of user: one more oriented toward portals and one more ori-
ented toward browsing. Portal users visit on average almost
four sites for each referrer, while surfers visit only about
1.5 sites. In support of this characterization, we note that
the overall mean ratio is 0.54, but that this drops to 0.37
among users with more than 60% of their traffic connected
to Facebook in some way.
6. DEFINING SESSIONS
When we contemplate the design of Web applications or
modeling the behavior of Web users, we are naturally drawn
to the notion of a Web session. The constrained environ-
ments in which we most often observe users on the Web make
it easy to imagine that a user sits down at the computer, fires
up a Web browser, issues a series of HTTP requests, then
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Figure 7: Distribution of the ratio of unique refer-
ring sites to unique target sites for each user. We
approximate this bimodal distribution with two log-
normals with means at 0.28 and 0.65.
closes the browser and moves on to other, unrelated tasks.
This is certainly the behavior we observe when users visit
a research lab to participate in a study or must dial into a
modem pool before beginning to surf the Web. The subjects
of the present study did not fit these conditions; they have
24-hour access to dedicated network connections, and we
observed the traffic they generate in an environment that is
both their home and their workplace. This distinction made
us suspect that we might face some difficulty in selecting the
optimal value for a timeout.
In our first attempt to segment individual click streams
into sessions, we settled on a five-minute inactivity time-
out as a reasonable start, a decision informed by previous
research in the field [19]. We found that each user’s click
stream split into an average of 520 sessions over the two-
month period. A typical session lasted for a bit over ten
minutes and included around sixty requests to twelve dif-
ferent Web servers. These values seemed plausible for the
population: one can imagine the typical student participat-
ing in ten ten-minute Web sessions every day.
The straightforward approach of identifying sessions us-
ing inactivity timeouts thus seemed promising, so we ex-
perimented with a variety of different timeouts to find an
optimal value. Because of the log-normal distributions of
user activity we had seen, it did not seem unreasonable to
suppose that some of the per-session statistics would remain
relatively constant as we adjusted the timeout and others
would show dramatic changes in the neighborhood of some
critical threshold.
The results, shown in Figure 8, show this to be far from
the case. All the statistics we examined (mean number of
sessions per user, session duration, number of requests, and
number of hosts contacted) turn out to exhibit strong and
regular dependence on the particular timeout used. They
have no large discontinuities, areas of particular stability, or
even local maxima and minima. This implies there is no
reason based on the data to select one timeout threshold
over any other; the choice is purely arbitrary and becomes
the prime determiner of all relevant statistics.
While we did expect some dependence on the timeout
value, this result surprised us. We conjectured that the ob-
served behavior might be a side-effect of considering every
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Figure 8: Session statistics as a function of timeout.
Top left: Mean duration of sessions in seconds. Top
right: Mean number of hosts contacted. Bottom
left: Mean number of requests. Bottom right: Mean
number of sessions per user.
user’s sessions as part of the same distribution; if we were to
observe the click streams of individual users, we might see
more pronounced clustering of HTTP requests in time.
To test this notion, we picked several users at random.
For each one, we found the distribution of “interclick times”,
defined as the number of seconds elapsed between each pair
of successive page requests. A user with n requests in their
click stream would thus yield n − 1 interclick times. If a
user’s activity were typified by tight bursts of requests with
long periods of inactivity between them, we would expect
to find a steep decline in the tail of the probability density
function at the point where the interclick time no longer rep-
resents the time between requests but the time between en-
tire sessions. Instead, we found that the users’ distributions
of interclick times could be closely approximated by power-
law distributions Pr(∆t) ∼ ∆t−τ over nearly six orders of
magnitude, as shown in Figure 9. Moreover, we found τ < 2
in each case, suggesting that there is no central tendency at
all to the time between a user’s requests, and that no delay
can really be considered atypical of a user.
The possibility remained that these randomly selected
users might be outliers, so we automated the process of cal-
culating the probability density function for a user’s distri-
bution of interclick times using log-binned histograms and
then fitting the result to a power law approximation. We
were able to fit each distribution to a power law with a mean
R2 value of 0.989. The resulting distribution of power-law
exponents, shown in Figure 10, is strongly normal with a
mean value 〈τ〉 ≈ 1.6. This confirmed the finding that in-
terclick times have no central tendency; in fact, scale-free
behavior is so pervasive that a user agent exhibiting regular-
ity in the timing of its requests would constitute an anomaly.
These results make it clear that a robust definition of Web
session cannot be based on a simple timeout.
The next natural approach would be to segment a click
stream into sessions based on the rolling average of the num-
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Figure 9: The distributions of the time between
successive requests for four randomly selected users.
Each distribution is well approximated by power
laws with exponents below two, suggesting both
unbounded variance and the lack of a well-defined
mean.
ber of clicks per unit time dropping below a threshold value.
This approach turns out to be even more problematic than
using a simple timeout, as there are now two parameter to
consider: the width of the window for the rolling average and
the threshold value. If the window selected is too narrow,
then the rolling average will often drop all the way to zero,
and the scheme becomes prey to the same problems as the
simple timeout. If the window selected is too large, then the
rolling average is so insensitive to change that meaningful
segmentation is impossible. In the end, the choice is once
again arbitrary. Moreover, examination of the moving aver-
age click rate for several users shows that the magnitudes of
the spikes in the click rate fit a smooth distribution. This
makes the selection of a threshold value arbitrary as well:
the number of sessions becomes a function of the threshold
rather than a feature of the data itself.
Logging both the referring URL and target URL for HTTP
requests makes possible a third and more robust approach
to constructing user sessions. We expand on the notion of
referrer trees as described in [19] to segment a user’s click
stream into a set of logical sessions based on the following
algorithm:
1. Initialize the set of sessions T and the map N : U 7→ T
from URLs to sessions.
2. For each request with referrer r and target u:
(a) If r is the empty referrer, create a new session t
with root node u, and set N(u) = t.
(b) Otherwise, if the session N(r) is well-defined, at-
tach u to N(r) if necessary, and set N(u) = N(r).
(c) Otherwise, create a new session t with root node r
and single leaf node u, and set N(r) = N(u) = t.
This algorithm assembles requests into sessions based on
the referring URL of a request matching the target URL of a
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Figure 10: The distribution of the exponent τ for
the best power-law approximation to the distribu-
tion of interclick times for each user. The fit is a
normal distribution with mean 〈τ〉 = 1.6 and stan-
dard deviation σ = 0.1. These low values of τ indi-
cate unbounded variance and the lack of any central
tendency in the time between requests for a Web
surfer.
previous request. Requests are assigned to the session with
the most recent use of the referring URL. Furthermore, each
instance of a request with an empty referrer generates a new
logical session.
Before we examine the properties of the logical sessions
defined by this algorithm, we must highlight the differences
between logical sessions and our intuitive notion of session.
A logical session does not represent a period of time in which
a user opens a Web browser, browses some set of Web sites,
and then leaves the computer. It instead connects requests
related to the same browsing behavior. If the user opens
links in multiple tabs or uses the browser’s back button,
the subsequent requests will all be part of the same logical
session. If the user then jumps directly to a search engine,
they will start a new logical session. Tabbed browsing and
use of the back button make it entirely possible for a user to
have multiple active logical session at any point in time. A
user who always keeps a popular news site open in a browser
tab might have a logical session related to that site that
lasts for the entire collection period. Logical sessions thus
segment a user’s click stream into tasks rather than time
intervals. They also enjoy the advantage of being defined
without reference to any external parameters, making their
properties comparable across data sets and insensitive to the
judgment of individual researchers.
The first statistics of interest for these logical sessions con-
cern their tree structures. The number of nodes in the tree
is a count of the number of requests in the session. In Fig-
ure 11A, we show the probability density function for the
per-user distribution of the average size of a logical session.
This distribution is well approximated with a log-normal
function, showing that the typical user has a mean of around
6.1 requests per session. The depth of the trees indicates the
extent to which users follow chains of links during a Web-
related task. Figure 11B shows the distribution of the av-
erage depth of the logical sessions for each user. It is again
well-approximated with a log-normal, showing that a typical
user’s sessions have a depth of about three links. In other
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Figure 11: Distributions of the mean number of
requests per logical session per user (A) and the
mean depth of logical session per user (B). In both
cases, we consider only non-trivial trees. We show
reference log-normal fits to each distribution.
words, an average session usually travels no more than two
clicks away from the page on which it began.
The ratio between the number of nodes in each tree and
its depth is also of interest. If this ratio is equal to 1, then
the tree is just a sequence of clicks, which corresponds to the
assumptions of the random walker model used by PageRank.
As this ratio grows past 1, the branching factor of the tree
increases, the assumptions of PageRank break down, and a
random walker must either backtrack or split into multiple
agents. Figure 12 shows the distribution of the average node-
to-depth ratio for each user, which is well-approximated by a
normal distribution with mean 〈µ〉 = 1.94. We thus see that
sessions have structure that cannot be accurately modeled
by a stateless random walker: there must be provision for
backtracking or branching.
Although there is a strong central tendency to the mean
size and depth of a logical session for each user, the same
does not hold for logical sessions in general. In Figure 13, we
show the distributions of the node count and depth for log-
ical sessions aggregated across all users. When we remove
per-user identifying information in this way, we are once
again confronted with heavy-tailed distributions exhibiting
unbounded variance. This implies that the detection of au-
tomated browsing traffic is a much more tractable task if
some form of client identity can be retained.
Even though we have defined sessions logically, they can
still be considered from the perspective of time. If we cal-
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Figure 12: The distribution of the average ratio
of the node count to the tree depth for the logical
sessions of each user. The fit is a normal distribution
with mean µ = 1.94 and standard deviation σ = 0.28,
showing that the branching factor of logical sessions
is significantly greater than one.
culate the difference between the timestamp of the request
that first created the session and the timestamp of the most
recent request to add a leaf node, we obtain the duration
of the logical session. When we examine the distribution
of the durations of the sessions of a user, we encounter the
same situation as for the case of interclick times: power-law
distributions Pr(∆t) ∼ ∆t−τ for every user. Furthermore,
when we consider the exponent of the best power-law fit of
each user’s data, we find the values are normally distributed
with a mean value 〈τ〉 ≈ 1.2, as shown in Figure 14. No
user has a well-defined mean duration for their logical ses-
sions; as also suggested by the statistics of interclick times,
the presence of strong regularity in a user’s session behavior
would be anomalous.
It is natural to speculate that we can get the best of both
worlds by extending the definition of a logical session to in-
clude a timeout, as was done in previous work on referrer
trees [19]. Such a change is quite straightforward to im-
plement: we simply modify the algorithm so that a request
cannot attach to an existing session unless the attachment
point was itself added within the timeout. This allows us
to have one branch of the browsing tree time out while still
allowing attachment on a more active branch.
While the idea is reasonable, we unfortunately find that
the addition of such a timeout mechanism once again makes
the statistics of the sessions strongly dependent on the par-
ticular timeout selected. As shown in Figure 15, the number
of sessions per user, mean node count, mean depth, and ra-
tio of nodes to tree depth are all dependent on the timeout.
On the other hand, in contrast to sessions defined purely
by timeout, this dependence becomes smaller as the time-
out increases, suggesting that logical sessions with a timeout
of around 15 minutes may be a reasonable compromise for
modeling and further analysis.
7. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have built on the network-sniffing ap-
proach to gathering Web traffic that we first explored in [13],
extending it to track the behavior of individual users. The
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Figure 13: Distributions of the number of requests
per logical session (A) and the depth of each logical
session (B), with reference power-law fits.
resulting data set provides an unprecedented and accurate
picture of human browsing behavior in a hypertext informa-
tion space as manifested by over a thousand undergraduate
students in their residences.
The data confirm previous findings about long-tailed dis-
tributions in site traffic and reveal that the popularity of
sites is likewise unbounded and without any central ten-
dency. They also show that while many aspects of Web
traffic have been shown to obey power laws, these power-
law distributions often represent the aggregate of distribu-
tions that are actually log-normal at the user level. The
lack of any regularity in interclick times for Web users leads
to the conclusion that sessions cannot be meaningfully de-
fined with a simple timeout, leading to our presentation of
logical sessions and an algorithm for deriving them from a
click stream. These logical sessions illustrate further draw-
backs of the random surfer model and can be modified to
incorporate timeouts in a relatively robust way.
These findings have direct bearing on future work in mod-
eling user behavior in hypertext navigation. The stability
of the proportion of empty-referrer requests across all users
implies that although not every page is equally likely to be
the cause of a jump, the overall chance of a jump occurring
is constant in the long run. The finding that the branch-
ing factor of the logical sessions is definitely greater than
one means that plausible agent-based models for random
walks must incorporate state, either through backtracking
or branching [3].
Our indications as to which distributions show central
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Figure 14: The distribution of exponent τ for the
best power-law approximation to the distribution of
logical session duration for each user. The fit is a
normal distribution with mean 〈τ〉 = 1.2 and stan-
dard deviation σ = 0.06. These low values of τ indi-
cate unbounded variance and the lack of any central
tendency in the duration of a logical session.
tendencies and which do not are of critical importance for
anomaly detection and anonymization. To appear plau-
sibly human, an agent must not stray too far from the
expected rate of requests, proportion of empty-referrer re-
quests, referrer-to-host ratio, and node count and tree depth
values for logical sessions. Because these are log-normal dis-
tributions, agents cannot deviate more than a multiplicative
factor away from their means. At the same time, a clever
agent must mimic the heavy-tailed distributions of the spac-
ing between requests and duration of sessions; too much reg-
ularity appears artificial.
Although our method of collection does afford us with a
large volume of data, it suffers from several disadvantages
which we are working to overcome in future studies. First,
our use of the file extension (if any) in requested URLs is a
noisy indicator of whether a request truly represent a page
fetch. We are also unable to detect whether any request is
actually satisfied or not; many of the requests may actually
result in server errors or redirects. Both of these problems
could be largely mitigated without much overhead by cap-
turing the first packet of the server’s response, which should
indicate an HTTP response code and a content type in the
case of successful requests.
This data set is inspiring the development of an agent-
based model that replaces the uniform distributions of Page-
Rank with more realistic distributions and incorporates book-
marking behavior to capture the branching behavior ob-
served in logical sessions [9].
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